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The purpose of this paper is to examine the decline and fall of British power. “Power” is defined as 
the ability to influence another party and Michael Mann’s four sources of social power is employed as an 
analytical tool.
While on the face of it Britain possesses a number of indicators which suggest that it is a major 
power, it is argued that those indicators may not reveal the full extent of the decline of British power over 
a period of time and which has been accentuated by the outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016.
The downward trajectory of power is examined through the prism of two examples. The first concerns 
Korea and Britain’s involvement in the war of 1950–1953 but also through the influence of Britain’s then 
prime minister with the US President over the defence of Europe as well as lobbying the US on its threat-
ened use of nuclear weapons. The contrast with the British stance on the latest crisis on the peninsular 
could not be starker and the silence of the British government reflects the fall of British influence notwith-
standing claims to the contrary post referendum of a “Global Britain”.
The second example concerns Britain’s situation post fall of the Berlin Wall, post Gulf War and even 
post Masstricht Treaty (which saw Britain secure several opt outs from the European Union) and its role 
in 1994 in securing the territorial integrity of Ukraine. British influence might be viewed as still significant 
although the ejection from the Exchange Rate Mechanism – a blow to its Political Power and Economic 
Power – was a modest harbinger of its vulnerability to economic crises – an all too familiar theme of its 
modern history. The events post Crimean occupation and post invasion of Eastern Ukraine witnessed the 
UK absent from the ensuing negotiations which were led by Germany and France from the European side. 
The UK was already withdrawing into itself from its (relatively modest political although not insignificant 
defence) role in Europe, let alone a Global role it purported to aspire to.
The curves of both events intersect at a point on a downward trajectory.
The paper, in addition to Mann’s Four Sources of Social Power, is supplemented by the introduction 
of his fifth – “Leadership” as well as considering the use of the intelligence services, which constitute a 
blend of both political and military instrumentality employed to achieve a desired set out of outcomes to 
protect its interests and further its aims in the global order. The paper also considers the interstices of the 
various sources. In particular, attention is drawn to the fifth source noted by Mann – that of “Leadership” and 
that British sources of social power had particularly diminished during the Cameron and May governments 
and with it, its strategic outlook.
The paper is the first in a series that will examine the Decline & Fall of British Power since 1945.
Метою статтi є пояснення занепаду й падіння могутності британії. у той час як Великобританія 
демонструє низку показників, які свідчать про її міць, у статті стверджується, що ці показники мо-
жуть не розкривати всю масштабність падіння британської влади протягом певного періоду часу, що 
було підкреслено результатом чергового референдуму в березні – червні 2016 року. Як аналітичний 
інструмент застосовується теорія джерел соціальної влади Майкла Манна. у роботі також розгляда-
ються межі між різними джерелами соціальної влади. Зокрема, звертається увага на п’яте джерело, 
зазначене М. Манном, – «лідерство», а також на те, що британські джерела соціальної влади були 
особливо ослаблені за уряду Д. Кемерона та травневого референдуму.
ця стаття є першою в серії, присвяченій вивченню падіння й занепаду влади/потужності бри-
танії з 1945 року.
целью статьи является объяснение упадка и падения мощи британии. В то время как Велико-
британия демонстрирует ряд показателей, которые свидетельствуют о ее мощи, в статье утвержда-
ется, что эти показатели могут не раскрывать всю масштабность падения британской власти в тече-
ние определенного периода времени, что было подчеркнуто результатом очередного референдума 
в марте – июне 2016 года. В качестве аналитического инструмента применяется теория источников 
социальной власти Майкла Манна. В работе также рассматриваются границы между различными 
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источниками социальной власти. В частности, обращается внимание на пятый источник, указанный 
М. Манном, – «лидерство», а также на то, что британские источники социальной власти были осо-
бенно ослаблены при правительстве Д. Кэмерона и майском референдуме.
Эта статья является первой в серии, посвященной изучению падения и упадка власти/мощи 
британии с 1945 года.
Key words: Britain, power, sources of social power, Leadership.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the decline and fall of British power. “Power” is defined as 
the ability to influence another party. Michael Mann has argued that there are four sources of power as: 
economic, political, military, ideological [15].
Mann in the course of his four works on this has also outlined a fifth source of power – that of Lead-
ership [16]. He mentions this in passing and asides from a number of examples – such as Napoleon and 
Bismarck – otherwise the point is moot. I remain hesitant to diverge from this assumption for a number of 
reasons. Foremost is that it may give undue prominence to certain persons and a wish to avoid the “Scylla 
and Charybdis” situation of engaging in hagiography on one side and outright denigration on the other. If 
I may betray bias, it is towards that of attributing a fair amount of criticism all round and on a cross party 
basis as I will argue both the leading parties in the UK and their leaders have contributed to the current 
position the UK faces.
Balance sheet of Power
On the face of it – at first appearance, the UK still enjoys a measure of power on the world. Taking the 
relevant sources above and excluding for the moment the “Ideological” source, we can note the following 
position of the UK in the international order:
– UK accounts for 12,8% of population and 16% of GDP of total EU;
– Number 5 economy in world with USD 2,6 trillion (IMF, UN, WB) – 2016;
– Member of NATO; one of few to have met 2% spending limit; nuclear weapons;
– Intel and Defence interests: member of “Five Eyes”1 agreement with major sigint and surveillance 
assets; respected intelligence services (MI5/SIS2; Top 10 ranking as military power3);
– IMF member – 4,04% shareholding; (with France, largest shareholder after USA, China and 
Germany);
– UN Security Council member with veto power;
– “London is the most competitive financial centre in the world” – ranking 2015.
Just a few comments on the above. As a result of the referendum on 23 June 2016, the UK voted 
to exit the European Union after just forty years of membership. A lack of clarity on “what happens next?” 
led to sterling depreciating against foreign currencies of around 15%. The UK’s dollar denominated GDP 
dropped accordingly such that the UK became the sixth largest economy in the world by the end of 20174.
That said, while GDP and indeed GDP per capita are useful indicators, they are not without their limi-
tations and their deficiencies have been dealt with elsewhere5. The UK’s economic performance post World 
War II has been a mixed bag to say the least and other leading members of the EU, such as Germany, 
France and even Italy (for a period) have enjoyed better indicators. The OECD has recently announced that 
the UK’s economic performance outlook for 2018 will be among the lowest of its members [7].
The inclusion of intelligence services and their assets may appear odd at first appearance. They 
do not really appear in the Mann analysis as a separate “source” of power but it is argued that it may 
well be unwise to ignore this for a number of reasons both specific to the UK and general in terms of how 
intelligence services can constitute an important sub category of both “political” and “military” power which 
operating either individually on separate tracks or on their own or, in certain circumstances, combined, can 
serve both to amplify existing sources and achieve particular outcomes of both a positive and negative 
nature. They also constitute a deliberate means of securing “economic” power.
1 This refers to an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States for 
cooperating in collection of signals intelligence. The UK responsible body is GCHQ based in Cheltenham but with several foreign 
installations as well.
2 MI5 handles domestic security and counterespionage; SIS is the foreign intelligence service.
3 See: https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp (for 2017).
4 See: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx.
5 I will argue in a later paper that GDP measures are just a small part of what constitutes Economic Power. Other constituents can be 
how the UK derived its wealth: the sugar trade, slave trade, opium trade, the destruction of local manufactures and looting of India, its 
colonial ties, the involvement in BP and the Middle East, the leading role of the City of London and also its historic as well as ongoing 
role in the world’s financial architecture through its joint creation with the USA of the Bretton Wood institutions of 1944 – the UK is still 
a leading shareholder in the IMF.
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A separate facet to also be considered is that of “Leadership” in terms of the use of intelligence, 
assuming of course it has been obtained in the first place by whatever means. This has been examined by 
Aldrich in his work which has examined the exploitation, to various degrees, of intelligence by British prime 
ministers since Asquith up to David Cameron [2].
An example of this dovetailing of military, political, economic sources as well as of intelligence ser-
vices can be found in the events leading up to the coup in 1953 in Iran that unseated the country’s Prime 
Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. In this instance, Britain’s leading oil company, BP was a major contrib-
utor to the British economy [8, p. 48]. The nationalisation of its oil interests in Iran thus constituted a sin-
gular blow to the Britain’s economic power, through diminished share of profits and critically for a country 
perennially troubled by currency problems, a major source of foreign exchange6; as well as political power 
through the Iranian government asserting its interests in political sovereignty encouraging other Middle 
Eastern countries to consider taking control of their oil resources or indeed other British colonies pursuing 
political independence.
A naval embargo – encompassing the threatened use of military power – against Port Abidjan, the 
major oil refinery and transportation hub in Iran in September 1951 (under the then Labour government 
entering its twilight period in office and replaced with a Conservative government under Churchill from 
26 October 1951) had not led to a resolution. A British intelligence operation – codenamed Boot – devel-
oped by SIS using both human assets in the Iranian military, parliament, business, press and religious 
sectors and disbursement of money would be folded into a latter joint CIA-SIS operation – codenamed 
Ajax – which would see the unseating of Mossadegh in August 1953 and the restoration of the Shah to the 
throne (the Shah would later fall from power in 1978 following the Iranian Revolution).
The UK’s trajectory of power: 2 Case studies
A problem in considering contemporary issues is to become lost in the myriad of detail and reports, 
thereby losing perspective and to avoid the means to frame particular events or occurrences in their particular 
context. This can be also influenced by personal bias – a consideration of the present through current dislikes 
and prejudices – or even a predisposition to idealise (or possibly idolise) past events and even personalities.
In his four-volume The Pride and Fall series [4] the British historian, Corelli Barnett, traced the decline 
of British power during the twentieth century up to 1950. In these works, Barnett noted the relevant dissipa-
tion of (to borrow from Mann again) the economic, military and political sources of power available to Britain 
(as supplemented by failing to take advantage of technology) as crystallised in a poor strategic position 
post 1945 and their impact on British “values”; and indeed the negative feedback loop from “values” onto 
the relevant sources of power. The “values” affected were essentially those of the governing classes in 
Britain. It is worth bearing in mind that while the governing classes in 1950 would constitute the ruling 
Labour government (elected in a landslide in 1945) under Atlee, Barnett has allocated a considerable 
amount of blame to all of the ruling parties whether they be Conservative, Liberal and Labour (and indeed 
coalitions thereof at points in time).
The Korean peninsular: a far away country of which we know little?
One of the examples neatly follows this chronological order and takes place in 1950. On 25 June 
1950, the armed forces of North Korea invaded South Korea. The United Nations Security Council unani-
mously condemned the invasion with UN Security Council Resolution 82. At the time, the members of the 
Council were the USA, UK, France and the USSR. As the USSR had disputed the fact that the People’s 
Republic of China had not been allowed to take up its seat on the council following Mao’s victory in that 
country’s civil war in 1949, it had boycotted the UN proceedings. The USSR’s absence had permitted the 
other three members – the USA, UK and France, to implement resolution 83 which allowed member states 
to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea without the USSR being able to wield its veto.
The then President Truman faced an invasion of its ally on the Korean peninsular whilst also a signif-
icant potential threat from the Soviet Union in Europe. Thus, as a means to counter any moves in the latter, 
he ordered the deployment of nuclear capable bombers to US bases in the UK.
The retreat of South Korean and the limited US forces to the south of the peninsular threatened to 
overwhelm them before UN forces came to their assistance. Thus, Truman threatened the use of nuclear 
weapons to attack both the North Koreans and deter Chinese involvement.
The British involvement in the Korean War was undertaken through a military component – the 1sT 
Commonwealth Division; and a naval force including an aircraft carrier.
A statement by Truman that the use of nuclear weapons were always an option led to the then British 
prime minister Atlee decision to fly to Washington for consultations with Truman.
A biographer of Atlee has noted that the meeting between the two constituted a “frank representation 
of differences in strategy and international policy (which) undoubtedly helped prevent hostilities in Korea 
escalating into a wider conflict, possibly a Third World War” [11, p. 447, 462]. Of interest was Atlee seeking 
6 And least we forget: the era of cheap oil would help underpin the West’s economic development (or “Economic” power) from this 
time right up until the 1970s before the 1973 OPEC price increases and the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979.
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to talk down the US from use of nuclear weapons on the peninsular and against mainland China, encour-
aging are entry onto mainland China of the defeated Nationalist forces as well as avoiding a diversion of 
attention from the European theatre whose security and stability might be compromised. There was also 
an agreement that the British would participate in any decision to use nuclear weapons. It was considered 
unlikely that Churchill could have obtained as much from such talks.
The Trump Presidency and the Brexit vote have led to the UK displaying both passivity and silence 
as events unfurled on the Korean peninsular. The recourse by Trump to visiting “fire and fury” on North 
Korea and threats to employ nuclear weapons on the peninsular in some form of pre emptive attack – the 
so called “bloody nose” strike scenario [12] – elicited barely any response from the British government.
The FCO briefing on North Korea stated the following: “Tensions are high due to the number of mis-
sile launches carried out by DPRK and the threat of further missile or nuclear tests. There were 2 nuclear 
tests in 2016 and 1 in 2017, a series of ballistic missile tests in 2016 and 2017, 2 intercontinental ballistic 
missile tests in July 2017 and 1 in November 2017”. There was no reference to the US itself contributing 
to these tensions7. The author was present in DPRK in July and noted no such tensions in his interactions 
with the North Koreans.
The Foreign Secretary, not known for maintaining a diplomatic silence on anything of consequence 
or indeed anything at all, has been as “quiet as a church mouse” on Korea8.
There is case to be made – see also the next case study – that the UK government was silent due 
to its poor situation arising from the Brexit referendum. Whilst President Obama was adamant in the run up 
to the referendum that the UK would need “to be at the back of the line” for such negotiations. The Trump 
administration has made more encouraging noises. Given Trump’s stated intent to ensure that only the US 
should enter agreements on its own zero-sum terms and therefore for its sole benefit, it is a measure of 
the UK’s weak position as well as the government’s desperation to portray such a trade deal as within its 
grasp that it is prepared to sustain the fiction of a truly “Global Britain” post Brexit. Observers have noted 
that such trade deals can take a decade or so to negotiate and then to be ratified by a Congress not averse 
to pursuing the interests of business donors and special interests. The “Special Relationship” is thus likely 
to be realised under this new trading arrangement in the flood of food and drug products that otherwise do 
not meet EU standards and the dismantling of the National Health Service [10].
Of interest is that UK pushback to Trump has focused on relatively modest domestic matters such 
as disclosure of details concerning the Manchester bombing and the President’s retweeting of videos of 
doubtful provenance by an extreme right British organisation enjoying negligible popular support9.
British self absorption with the Brexit process has led it to disengage from possible EU based ini-
tiatives to mitigate tensions on the Korean peninsular. Thus, one means of the European Union wishing 
to pursue negotiations, in a format based on the P5+1 talks which led to an agreement with Iran on its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, has not emerged given the UK’s unwillingness to cross Trump on his Korea 
outbursts and its antipathy to a European dimension for conducting foreign policy. After all, the exit from 
the institutions of the European Union also led to its withdrawal of British personnel from the European 
External Action Service – the EU’s diplomatic service and foreign and defence ministry in which it was well 
represented.
Johnson’s poor performance in this role has attracted critical comments: “All over the world the geo-
political tectonic plates are shifting yet at this time of huge global significance the foreign secretary is all 
but invisible on the international stage. On the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, the crisis over Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar or the clash between the US and China, he is irrelevant. On Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, 
Russia, Venezuela, Turkey and Yemen, he is incoherent” [19].
Absent without leave on Ukraine
The absence of the UK during the course of the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 was a more serious harbinger 
of the extent of the decline and fall of UK power since, unlike the Korean problems whose then-and-now 
7 See: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/north-korea/safety-and-security (Accessed 18 February 2018). The author visited the 
DPRK for three weeks in July 2017.
8 The present incumbent, Boris Johnson, is viewed as one of the weakest foreign secretaries in living, and probably distant, memory. 
Again it is measure of the poor state of the Conservative Party and its internal management that this leading cabinet position has 
been allocated to an individual temperamentally unsuited and ill qualified to occupy. The fact that the Brexit process is essentially 
being handled by Downing Street/Cabinet office, as well as the newly established Department for Exiting the Economic Union and the 
Department for International Trade is perhaps a reflexion of the Prime Minister’s wish to distance Johnson as much as possible from 
the Brexit process, whose intricate details and sheer bureaucratic nitty-gritty would overwhelm him.
9 Trump’s handling of confidential top secret information is a story in itself. It has been noted that he disclosed to the Russians in the 
White House information gleaned by the Israeli Mossad from a high level source in Islamic State much to the Israeli’s considerable 
annoyance over this breach of protocol. Trump’s approach to intelligence can be contrasted with a number of his predecessors which 
has been set out in [3]. According to Wolff, in his book on the Trump presidency with respect to intelligence briefings: “(Trump) seemed 
to lack the ability to take in third-party information. Or maybe he lacked the interest; whichever he seemed almost phobic about having 
formal demands on his attention. He stonewalled every written page and balked at every explanation”. Trump’s riposte to the Syrians 
employing chemical weapons by a cruise missile attack on Al Shayrat airbase was prompted by his daughter, Ivanka, putting together 
a presentation of pictures of victims of the chemical attack rather than any intelligence briefing [20, p. 114, 119].
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narrative bookmarked 1950 and 2017, the problems took place just before the EU referendum in 2016 and 
constituted an abdication from a position which the UK had entered into only in 1994 with its signature on 
the Bucharest Agreement whereby it undertook to preserve the territorial integrity of this country.
Before considering the nature of the UK’s signing up to the Bucharest Agreement, some background 
on the state of affairs in the 1990s. Following the resignation of Margaret Thatcher from the premiership in 
November 1990, John Major became prime minister. Major was thrust almost immediately into the Middle 
East crisis where Iraq had invaded Kuwait and, as a consequence, the US and an alliance of nations (with 
the UK providing the second largest component in the then ongoing military buildup) poised to launch 
Desert Storm in March 1991 which would see the Iraqi military driven back to within its own borders in a 
crushing defeat.
Major would thus be able to bask in a military victory of consequence and successfully negotiated 
the Maastricht Treaty in November 1991 which secured a number of opt outs from the then ongoing Euro-
pean project for an “ever closer union”. Thus, in the abstract, Military Power had secured “dividends” in 
both avoiding a diminution in Economic Power which might ensue with Iraq controlling Kuwaiti oil reserves 
and threatening the stability of the oil market via its armed presence in proximity to Saudi oil reserves, as 
well as an enhanced Political Power in terms of demonstration of British military abilities and a willingness 
to honour commitments. The UK had committed military forces to Kuwait to prevent a then perceived Iraqi 
threat of invasion in 1962. Kuwait had since become a significant source of oil supplies as well as a major 
investor in the UK.
Major’s increased stature, combined with an opposition leader still facing questions over his suita-
bility for prime minister, proved sufficient to win the General Election and secure the Conservative Party its 
four consecutive electoral victory by winning 14 million votes and the most votes in British electoral history.
But within a short period, Major’s premiership, like the Ozymandias figure of Percy Shelley’s poem, 
had turned to dust10. On 16 September 1992, known as “Black Wednesday”, Britain was humiliatingly 
ejected from the Exchange Rate Mechanism which it had joined and committed to protect the rate of ster-
ling against wide exchange rate variations. While the UK enjoyed a reasonable economic recovery after its 
withdrawal and reduced unemployment, it was to be a “never glad confident morning again” for Major’s gov-
ernment as splits in the party – eerily familiar in the events playing out in May’s government today and even 
involving some of the same faces – and sleaze undermined its credibility. In the 1997 general Election, the 
Conservative Party would suffer the worst electoral defeat by a ruling party since the Reform Act of 1832.
Of note is that it was later reported that SIS had a high-ranking source in German government finan-
cial circles in the period preceding Black Wednesday [2, p. 402]. The Bundesbank, under its then head, 
Otto Pohl, were a key decision maker in the fate of the UK’s continued membership of the ERM. It appears 
that while the intelligence services were able to provide the relevant information, the British government 
seemed to convince itself that the German Chancellor Kohl could override the independence of the Bundes-
bank to effect a helping hand over sterling’s problems. This wishful thinking stumbled over the established 
institutional underpinnings of Germany’s independent central bank which prized its arms – length distance 
from politicians. The episode revealed the golden rule that intelligence is often only as good as the end per-
son making the ultimate decisions based thereon. Historical examples such as Chamberlain in the run up 
to Munich in 1938 and latter day instances in the run up to the Iraq War would lend credence to this rule11.
At the then OSCE conference held in Budapest on 5 December 1994, the UK had joined other 
nuclear powers such as the USA and the Russian Federation in providing security assurances against 
threats or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, in return for 
the latter voluntarily giving up nuclear weapons. Both China and France offered lesser assurances in sep-
arate memoranda.
In February 2014, forces of the Russian Federation seized Crimea and annexed the territory on 
1 March. Both constituted flagrant breaches of the Budapest Memorandum. While initially portrayed as a 
homegrown domestic disturbance culminating in armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine by the Russian Feder-
ation, this fiction became ever more difficult to maintain given the considerable influx of Russian military 
10 The second verse proceeds as follows: “And on the pedestal these words appear:
“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings;
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!’
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away”.
In a ranking of 19 Prime Ministers, Major came in at number 17 [18] It is most probable that the ranking may change given it omits 
Cameron and May who have not distinguished themselves in office as well as even Blair and Brown. That said, a new book reapprais-
ing Major by Hickson and Williams still left the questionmark lingering in its title.
11 In due course it will be interesting to observe how the intelligence services provided input to the May government over the Brexit 
negotiations with the EU-27 and the European Commission and its lead negotiators. I would predict that they will have delivered the 
right product but that it will not overcome the often insurmountable obstacle of poor political leadership. See Aldrich et al, op cit, for 
his critical assessment of prime ministers and their adeptness in the handling of intelligence. There is a certain measure of correlation 
between the BBC ranking above with that of Aldrich’s assessment.
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units, as protected by Russian airpower and surface to air missiles, hardware and other paraphernalia, to 
aid separatist units. That would become nigh impossible after the shooting down of Malaysian airplane 
MH-17 by a Russian surface to air missile fired by a Russian military unit deep inside Ukrainian territory.
In the aftermath of these events, it therefore became of interest how the relevant signatories would 
react. The first item of interest is when the USA and UK governments became aware of the military moves 
being undertaken by Russia. Of particular salience is whether the British intelligence services had picked 
up any indicators on its own account. Here it is worth considering whether the austerity measures imposed 
by the then Coalition government on all departments (including SIS) had also been compounded by a diver-
sion of resources to counter the threat of Islamic State emanating from Iraq and Syria, plus the ongoing 
Afghan-Pakistan conundrum12 to blind the UK to this emerging threat from the Russians. On one side, this 
remains difficult to believe given their history of animosity between the two dating back to the 1917 Revo-
lution and even during the Yeltsin and Putin period, the British intelligence establishment had taken note 
of an illegal bio weapons programme, the Litvinenko case [9] (an assassination in 2006 on British soil, no 
less, with nuclear substances), the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and subsequent annexation of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia13, cyberattacks on numerous countries in Central Europe, cutting off oil supplies et al.
It has been the seeming hesitation of the government to react and initiate sanctions that warrants a 
closer look. In particular, contrary to Corelli Barnet’s assertion that British politicians of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries had failed to look at the “bottom line” and act accordingly – a dubious proposition in the 
light of how all postwar British governments of all complexions vigorously pursued all sources of power to 
protect the country’s perceived Economic Power – the Cameron government was undoubtedly pursuing 
rational economic calculation ahead of deciding how to react to events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 
which constituted a major threat to Europe’s peace and stability.
Indeed, one of the aspects that the British government needed to pay attention to was BP, whom we 
have met before in the context of Iran in the early 1950s and which was undoubtedly a key contributor (at 
least historically) to Britain’s Economic Power14. At the time, BP faced major financial issues in respect of its 
culpability for the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe where its oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico had exploded and 
then led to the largest oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry. As of February 2013, criminal and civil 
settlements and payments to a trust fund had cost BP USD 42,2 billion.
On 8 December 2014, the US Supreme Court rejected BP’s legal challenge to a compensation deal 
over the oil spill. The settlement agreement had no cap, but BP initially estimated that it would pay roughly 
USD 7,8 billion to compensate victims. Later, in July 2015, BP agreed to pay a further USD 18,7 billion in 
fines, the largest corporate settlement in US history.
Throughout this period, BP faced an immense challenge in terms of disposing of its assets to 
generate cash to meet the everincreasing claims arising from the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. In October 
2012, BP sold its stake in its Russian joint venture TNK-BP to Rosneft for USD 12,3 billion in cash and 
an 18,5% stake in Rosneft – a leading Russian oil company built from the remains of Yukos which had 
been bankrupted by the Russian state and its CEO/founder Khordokovsky jailed and which was run by 
Igor Sechin, a well known Kremlin insider and crony of Vladimir Putin. The deal struck by BP was com-
pleted on 21 March 201315.
The TNK-BP had been a major contributor to BP’s bottom line: BP had invested USD 8 billion in 
2003 but had taken out USD 19 billion in dividends. A full exit which might have netted it a further USD 
27 billion from Russia was unfeasible and BP had agreed to invest in Rosneft. This deal, then, was the best 
that BP could possibly achieve in the circumstances. But it meant that USD 15 billion of capital – more than 
2 Seventeen years after their introduction into Afghanistan, there are still 600 British troops serving in the theatre engaging in training 
local forces and special operations against the Taliban [5]. Pakistan plays a complex game of enabling the Taliban in their armed 
conflict while providing occasional tip offs to the UK regarding British citizens of Pakistani descent training with the myriad of terrorist 
groups supported and trained by the Pakistani military with whom the UK has close relations. Pakistan is also of interest given its 
involvement in the notorious AQ Khan nuclear proliferation smuggling ring as well as its ever increasing nuclear arsenal.
13 Again, as with Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, the UK appears to have remained silent on the Georgia situation as indeed did the 
Bush administration in its waning days in office as it sought to contain the deepening Financial Crisis. Henry Paulson, the US Treasury 
Secretary, in his memoirs, reports that he became aware from Chinese contacts of a Russian approach to Beijing to enlist them in 
taking advantage of the crisis to further destabilise the USA’s financial system. The Chinese declined to get involved. The question 
remains as to whether the USA essentially declined to defend its purported ally, Georgia, due to these Russian threats? Or did it un-
wittingly allow the Russians to believe that they could blackmail the USA this way? The Russians did not believe that US/EU sanctions 
would be forthcoming or remain in place long after Crimea so it begs the question whether given its lethargic and craven attitude re 
Georgia, the West would also not react to the occupation of Crimea and invasion of Eastern Ukraine. Despite the Litvinenko killing, 
the UK also seems to have “pulled its punches” in 2008 following the invasion of Georgia with again a possible belief taking hold in the 
Kremlin that it could enjoy a “free ride”. The Syrian fiasco of non enforcement of “red lines” by the UK and USA in 2013 would have 
reconfirmed that judgement.
14 BP would later encourage the UK and Scottish government to release a Libyan imprisoned for involvement in the Lockerbie bomb-
ing of a PanAm plane due to the warming relations with Libya’s leader Gadaffi and BP’s interest in accessing the Libyan oil reserves. 
BP merits a book about it in the vein of Steve Coll’s book on Exxon [6].
15 See: https://web.archive.org/web/20140214072516/http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/uk-rosneft-tnkbp-deal-idUKBRE-
92K0IX20130322 (accessed 19 February 2018).
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10% of BP’s market value, was hostage to the whims of the Kremlin [17]. Furthermore, BP’s bottom line 
was heavily reliant on the Rosneft contribution, as noted below, in the years 2014 to 2016 (USD millions)16:
2016 2015 2014
Profit/(Loss) before tax and interest 430 (7,918) 6,412
Rosneft contribution 647 1,314 2,076
Rosneft/PBIT (%) 150,5 -* 32,4
* This means that without the Rosneft contribution, BP’s Loss before Interest and Tax would have amounted to USD 9,2 billion
BP’s ability to survive and to keep paying the bills from the Gulf of Mexico were thus in the hands of parties 
who might not look kindly on the UK seeking to honour its commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
In addition, as was also noted by Ben Judah [14], London and the UK’s south east had become sus-
ceptible to, and reliant on (addicted to?) considerable infusions of “funny money” from Russia, particularly in 
the financial and real estate sectors (known as “FIRE”), as well as legal services for which a number of City 
law firms relied on. The City of London in its longstanding role as the world’s leading financial intermediary 
in taking a percentage of the tens of billions of pounds “washing” through its financial institutions. The real 
estate industry – a major component of the UK given the importance of rising housing prices to a significant 
part of the population – also benefitted from infusions of Russian cash into the property market17.
The UK government initially appeared hesitant in its initial response but soon fell into line with the 
EU and the USA. Notwithstanding its initial commitment to the Budapest Memorandum, the UK preferred 
to “lead from behind” on the Ukraine crisis and then proceeded to outsource the negotiations of the Minsk 
agreements to the German and French governments.
The former head of SIS, Sir John Sawers would note that: “Germany and France were actively involved 
in dealing with the crisis in Ukraine, and the Russian intervention there. Britain wasn’t really in the room”.
Sawers has also pointed to the Cameron government of 2010 onwards when the UK’s power dimin-
ished [13]. He highlighted a number of factors that contributed to this: the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghan 
wars; the former of which had been launched under dubious circumstances among allegations of over 
exaggeration of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction potential, politicised intelligence to serve government 
purposes, inadequate attention to the aftermath and naivety about the intentions of Iran in the region with 
Saddam’s removal18.
A further influence was the consequences of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. This is noteworthy given 
that one of the few plaudits that Gordon Brown deserved as prime minister was his attention to the interna-
tional dimensions of the crisis and enhancing cooperation within the G-20 body to offset the real likelihood 
of a global depression through concerted action. Sawers points to the Cameron coalition government and 
its introduction of austerity measures and the adoption of a more insular outlook that inhibited British power.
To this was added poor leadership of Cameron in respect of the unfurling Syrian crisis and “the red 
line that never was” in the employment of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against civilian oppo-
nents. Sawers notes that Cameron wanted to “duck his responsibility” by allowing the House of Com-
mons a vote on whether to launch retaliation. He did not get his votes and in the USA, President Obama 
also sought to disown his own “red line” by seeking congressional approval. Neither man emerged with 
much credit from this affair and their propensity for inaction was duly noted by the appropriate parties in 
the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai.
This aspect of poor leadership has also been accentuated by the conduct of Theresa May as prime minister 
following the resignation of Cameron following the result of the Brexit referendum in June 2016119. Sawers (dip-
lomatically) noted of May that she is not “a natural at engaging on these big political issues with foreign leaders”.
16 See Note 5, p. 145–146: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/investors/bp-annual-report-and-form-20f-2016.pdf 
(accessed 18 February 2018).
17 “In the central London borough of Westminster, almost one in ten properties is owned by an anonymous offshore company and 
can’t be directly associated with a specific owner” [18].
A further facet is the opportunity provide of Russians raising finance in the London capital markets. For example, Oleg Deripaska, an 
oligarch closely linked to Putin and still subject to an entry ban by the USA for his alleged ties to organised crime, recently raised over 
GBP 1 billion for one of his entities [1].
18 Indeed, Colin Powell in his speech on 5 February 2003 to the UN making the case for war against Iraq referred to British intelligence 
(presumably SIS) obtaining information regarding the supply of nuclear materials from Niger to Iraq which was later found to be incor-
rect. The latter point re Iran has been borne out by events with Iraq’s Shiite government becoming almost a wholly dominated satellite 
of Tehran to the alarm and consternation of its (largely Sunni) neighbours. Indeed the removal of the Taliban in 2001 in another country 
neighbouring Iran, Afghanistan, has also emboldened Iranian influence there. Surely this cannot have been what either the USA or UK 
intended when they invaded Iraq?
19 Indeed since Cameron surprisingly won the General Election on 7 May 2015 and therefore felt obliged to honour his promise of a 
referendum on continuing EU membership, Britain’s diplomatic and other resources were squandered in a forlorn yearlong tour around 
the capitals of Europe seeking a figleaf for Cameron to declare victory and recommend a vote to remain in the EU. He failed. Camer-
on’s Panglossian politics of “all will be best in the best of all worlds” would be followed in due course by May’s Micawber like politics 
of “waiting for something to turn up”.
ВІСНИК НТУУ «КПІ». Політологія. Соціологія. Право. Випуск 1 (37) 2018
41
Conclusions
We have sought to employ Mann’s Four Sources of Power, as supplemented by the introduction of 
his fifth – “Leadership” as well as considering the use of the intelligence services, which constitute a blend 
of both political and military instrumentality to achieve a desired set out of outcomes which for the UK has 
represented for it a particular strategic result to protect its interests and further its aims in the global order.
We have noted that poor “Leadership” has often contributed to a diminution of three sources of social 
power namely: economic, military and political. And indeed the converse when Major benefitted from the 
first Gulf War victory in furthering Political and Economic Power and achieving a favourable strategic out-
come in Maastricht Treaty. However, the country’s weakening Economic Power and its ejection from the 
ERM diminished perceived Political Power within the country even if the UK still could project Political and 
Military Power externally to sign on to the Budapest Memorandum.
We have in passing also considered the role of BP, as a contributor to the country’s Economic and 
Political Power during the 1950s whose role in Iran led to the UK employing its intelligence services to 
sustain its critical position.
It is argued by reference to the Korean War – perhaps representing the apogee of post war British 
power – as well as the UK’s position in the post Cold War and post Gulf War international landscape – that 
British sources of social power had diminished during the Cameron and May governments and with it its 
strategic outlook. The Brexit decision had merely reinforced a trend underway in 2010 and exacerbated by 
poor leadership and poor policy decisions. The competence and standing of the intelligence services had 
been impaired by both the Iraq War and Austerity and without other complementary actions were unlikely 
to accomplish anything.
The sources of UK’s Economic Power had left it exposed to potentially revanchist powers such as 
Russia and China and its financial services and property sectors had been shown to cut both ways.
Further papers will, in the same vein, consider the following:
– Did the UK make the right choices open to it in the period post 1945 to maximise its strategic 
position based on the then endowment of sources of social power and instruments available to it?
– Has the UK allowed an ideology akin to “nostalgia illusion” affected its choices to squander its 
other sources of social power?
– Did its failure to pursue a leadership of Europe post 1945 impact its sources of social power? Was 
Britain ever really in a position to play “Greece to America’s Rome” as its prime minister Macmillan noted?
– Was it that the British Empire basis of the country’s wealth ultimately the cause of its breakdown 
of power?
References
1. Ambrose J. Oleg Deripaska to list energy group En+ in London. The Telegraph. 2017. URL: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/10/05/oleg-deripaska-list-11bn-energy-group-en-london/ 
(accessed: 19.02.2018).
2. Aldrich R., Cormac R. The Black Door. London: William Collins, 2017. 624 p.
3. Andrew C. For The President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from 
Washington to Bush. New York: Harper Perennial, 1996. 688 p.
4. Barnett C. The Collapse of British Power. London: Eyre Methuen, 1972. 500 p.
5. Bunkall A. Afghan security: Britain “should commit more troops”. SkyNews. 2018. URL: 
https://news.sky.com/story/afghan-security-britain-should-commit-more-troops-11257283 (accessed: 
19.02.2018).
6. Coll S. Private Empire: Exxon Mobil and American Power. London: Penguin, 2013. 704 p.
7. Chu B. UK economy to slow rapidly in 2018 as hard Brexit looms, OECD forecasts. Independent. 
2017. URL: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/uk-economy-growth-forecast-latest-
updates-hard-brexit-leave-eu-2018-projected-oecd-a7956776.html (accessed: 21.09.2017).
8. Curtis M. Secret Affairs. Serpents Tail: Profile Books, 2018. 512 p.
9. Cowell A. The Terminal Spy. London: Doubleday, 2008. 448 p.
10. Eaton G. The trade delusion: why Brexit won’t be Britain’s salvation. NewStatesman. 2018. URL: 
https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/02/trade-delusion-why-brexit-won-t-be-britains-
salvation (accessed: 19.02.2018).
11. Harris K. Attlee. London: Weidenfield, 1995. 520 p.
12. Hurst D. Former US military commander warns against “bloody nose” strike on North Korea. The 
Guardian. 2018. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/20/former-us-military-commander-
warns-against-bloody-nose-strike-on-north-korea (accessed: 20.02.2018).
13. Jay E. Former MI6 Head John Sawers: Brexit could pose long-term problems for British security. 
Prospect. 2018. URL: https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/former-mi6-head-john-sawers-
brexit-could-pose-long-term-problems-for-british-security (accessed: 18.02.2018).
ВІСНИК НТУУ «КПІ». Політологія. Соціологія. Право. Випуск 1 (37) 2018
42
14. Judah B. Fragile Empire. New York: USA Yale UP, 2014. 578 p.
15. Mann M. The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1. Cambridge: CUP, 2012. 578 p.
16. Mann M. The Sources of Social Power. Volume 2. Cambridge: CUP, 2012. 844 p.
17. Pratley N. Taking a stake in Rosneft is a big gamble for BP. The Guardian. 2012. URL: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/nils-pratley-on-finance/2012/oct/22/stake-rosneft-gamble-bp 
(accessed: 18.02.2018).
18. Smirnova O. Just who owns what in central London. BBC. 2016. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/
business-35757265 (accessed: 19.02.2018).
19. Sylvester R. Our foreign secretary is an international joke. The Times. 2017. URL: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/ 
article/our-foreign-secretary-is-an-international-joke-7707q0z66 (accessed: 29.08.2017).
20. Wolff M. Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House. London: Little Brown, 2018. 336 p.
